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Performance measures and short-termism:
an exploratory study
David Marginson, Laurie McAulay, Melvin Roush and Tony Van Zijl*
Abstract – We examine the relationship between performance measurement systems and short-termism. Hypotheses are
tested on a sample of senior managers drawn from amajor telecommunications company to determine the extent to which the
diagnostic and interactive uses of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial measures give rise to short-termism. We ﬁnd no evidence to
suggest that the use of ﬁnancial measures, either diagnostically or interactively, leads to short-term behaviour. In contrast, we
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant association between the use of non-ﬁnancial measures and short-termism. Results suggest that the
diagnostic use of non-ﬁnancial measures leads managers to make inter-temporal trade-off choices that prioritise the short
term to the detriment of the long term, while we ﬁnd interactive use is negatively associated with short-termism. We ﬁnd an
imbalance in favour of the diagnostic use over the interactive use of non-ﬁnancial performance measures is associated with
short-termism. Overall, ﬁndings highlight the importance of considering the speciﬁc use of performance measures in
determining the causes of short-termism.
Keywords: ﬁnancial measures, non-ﬁnancial measures, diagnostic control, interactive control, short-termism
1. Introduction
It is a well-established orthodoxy that ﬁnancial
measures such as proﬁt and return on capital
employed encourage short-termism (see, for
example: Hayes and Abernathy, 1980; Kaplan,
1984; Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; Ittner, Larcker
and Randall, 2003; Merchant and Van der Stede,
2007). Merchant and Van der Stede (2007: 452–
453), for instance, assert that, ‘Management
myopia, an excessive focus on short-term perform-
ance, is an almost inevitable side-effect of the use of
ﬁnancial results control systems built on accounting
measures of performance’. A major response to this
proposition has been to recommend the introduction
of additional, non-ﬁnancial measures, which
include customer satisfaction, quality and staff
attitude (see, for instance, Ittner and Larcker,
1998; Sliwka, 2002). This recommendation is
based upon the proposition that future orientated
non-ﬁnancial measures overcome the short-term
orientation encouraged by backward looking ﬁnan-
cial measures (Ittner, Larcker and Meyer, 2003;
Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007). Despite the
intuitive appeal of these two propositions, there is
surprisingly little supporting empirical evidence.
Our aim in this study is to address this lacuna.
Speciﬁcally, we explore (1) the orthodoxy that
ﬁnancial measures encourage short-termism; and
(2) the view that short-termism can be overcome by
using non-ﬁnancial measures.
Financial and non-ﬁnancial performance meas-
urement plays an important role in management
control systems generally (Otley, 1999; Bhimani
and Langﬁeld-Smith, 2007); and, more particularly,
it has been suggested that ‘virtually all writing on
management control systems refers to diagnostic
control systems’ (Simons, 1995: 60). A more
precise statement of the proposition that begins
this paper might therefore be stated in terms of the
impact of the diagnostic use of ﬁnancial measures
upon short-termism. The diagnostic use of perform-
ance measures (to monitor performance against pre-
set standards) can be contrasted with interactive use
(to encourage dialogue about strategic uncertain-
ties). These two ways of using performance meas-
ures have been shown to be central to management
control within a broader framework which incorp-
orates beliefs systems (the core values and direction
of the ﬁrm as set out in mission statements, credos
and statements of purpose) and boundary systems
(rules that establish constraints and deﬁne accept-
able activities) (Simons, 1995, 2000; see Widener,
2007 for a review).
Prior studies have shown that behavioural and
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organisational impacts of performance measures
may vary according to diagnostic use, interactive
use or through a combination of diagnostic and
interactive use (Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Henri,
2006). Our study of short-termism therefore con-
centrates on how diagnostic and interactive uses of
ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial measures affect short-
termism. The distinction between interactive and
diagnostic use is a new departure for studies of
short-termism, since prior research makes no
distinction between what Simons (1995, 2000)
argues are the two key roles for organisationally
based performance measures.
Our ﬁndings suggest that ﬁnancial measures may
have no impact on short-termism irrespective of the
manner of their use. These ﬁndings support other
studies that have failed toﬁnd a relationship between
ﬁnancial measures and short-termism (e.g. Van der
Stede, 2000; Marginson and McAulay, 2008). In
terms of the role played by non-ﬁnancialmeasures in
overcoming short-termism, our study suggests that
non-ﬁnancial measures used diagnostically may be
associated with short-termism, while the interactive
use of non-ﬁnancial measures may be negatively
associated with short-termism. Short-termism is
also evident where diagnostic use exceeds inter-
active use of non-ﬁnancial measures.
The paper makes two contributions. The ﬁrst is to
challenge the enduring orthodoxy that ﬁnancial
performance measures are responsible for short-
termism. The unquestioned assumption in the
literature is that type of measure (ﬁnancial versus
non-ﬁnancial) may be of prime importance in
shaping managerial short-termism. Our ﬁndings
challenge this assumption, and we advise that
consideration should additionally be given to the
speciﬁc ways performance measures are used. The
second contribution is thus to suggest that, where
performance measurement systems create short-
termism, the diagnostic or interactive use of the
systems may inﬂuence inter-temporal trade-off
decisions.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next
section reviews the literature. The literature review
begins by discussing the nature of short-termism
and then considers performance measurement sys-
tems and the claims that have been made for their
effect on short-termism. Section 3 develops hypoth-
eses by extending the literature review to consider
speciﬁc arguments relating to the diagnostic and
interactive uses of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial
measures. Sections 4 and 5 describe the research
method and instruments, Section 6 presents the
results of our analysis and Section 7 presents the
discussion and conclusions.
2. Short-termism and performance
measurement systems
‘Short-termism’ is generally used interchangeably
with ‘myopia’ to denote a temporal orientation that
prioritises the near term over the longer term.
Myopia and short-termism can be deﬁned as a
cognitive limitation that affects decision-making
(see Miller, 2002). Alternatively, myopia and short-
termism can be deﬁned in terms of disposition.
Samuel (2000: 494), for instance, deﬁnes share-
holder myopia as ‘the tendency of shareholders to
focus on the behaviour of stock prices in the short
term as opposed to the long term’ (emphasis added).
Similarly, a longstanding practice of measuring
short-termism, based upon a variable that assesses
the time managers spend on issues that will appear
in the proﬁt and loss statement within a speciﬁed
period of time (see Otley, 1978; Merchant, 1990;
Van der Stede, 2000), is consistent with a disposi-
tional view. The underlying assumption appears to
be that performance measures inﬂuence disposition;
and that managers subjected to control based upon
performance measures may, as a consequence, be
disposed to engage in short-termism.1
‘Short-termism’ and ‘short-term’ are related but
distinguishable terms. The short term is commonly
viewed as a one-year orientation normally consist-
ent with the budgeting cycle (Van der Stede, 2000:
611). The short term must be distinguished from
short-termism because it is not necessarily disad-
vantageous to take actions that are beneﬁcial within
a one-year period. The experience of ﬁnancial
adversity, for instance, may necessitate decisive
short-term actions to ensure long-term survival
(Ittner et al., 1997: 235; Van der Stede, 2000). A
deﬁnition of short-termism must therefore be
viewed not just in terms of the prioritisation of the
short term, but as actions taken in the short term
which damage the long-term effectiveness of the
ﬁrm and hence its value (e.g. Merchant, 1990: 299;
Laverty, 1996: 826; Van der Stede, 2000: 609–610;
Bhojraj and Libby, 2005: 1). The emphasis here is
not on cognitive constraints or dispositions, nor on
the need for managers to act in the short term, but on
the inter-temporal trade-off involved in actions
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1 The literature appears to imply that disposition results from
the inﬂuence of capital markets or performance measurement
systems. These inﬂuence behaviour irrespective of predispos-
ition. There is some evidence to suggest that this need not
necessarily be the case. For instance, Hofstede (2001: 361)
suggests that in ‘short-term orientated cultures the ‘bottom-line’
. . . is a major concern; control systems are focused on it and
managers are constantly judged by it’, and that culture
predisposes individuals to be short-termist. Performance meas-
urement systems may therefore represent a moderating variable
that ampliﬁes existing predispositions.
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taken to improve reported current performance to
the detriment of long-term value.
The introduction stated that there is surprisingly
little empirical evidence to support an association
between short-termism and ﬁnancial performance
measures. Nevertheless, there is limited support for
this relationship. Merchant (1990: 307–308; 311),
for instance, found a short-term orientation that
‘was positively associated with the felt impact of
ﬁnancial controls’. There is also limited empirical
evidence to support the corollary that managers who
avoid a sole reliance upon accounting performance
measures may adopt a more long-term orientation.
Building upon the modelling of the short-term
effects of budget use proposed by Hopwood (1972),
Otley (1978) reported that managers who adopted a
mixed evaluation style that balanced budget and
efﬁciency criteria2 ‘tended to spend a greater
proportion of their time on long-term planning’
(p. 131).
Yet, there is also evidence to suggest that
ﬁnancial measures may be used to support a long-
term view (Bhimani and Langﬁeld-Smith, 2007) or
that ﬁnancial measures may have no effect on
managers’ time preferences. Van der Stede (2000:
619) found no support for a direct effect of ﬁnancial
measures on short-termism and reported that ‘the
budgetary control style does not directly affect the
business unit managers’ time-orientation’. In place
of a direct effect, the association between ﬁnancial
measures and short-termism may be indirect. Van
der Stede (2000: 619) found a set of relationships
through which poor past performance led to the use
of more rigid controls and reduced slack thereby
causing short-termism. Additionally, in a study of
US and Japanese managers, Chow et al. (1996)
show that culture may mitigate the effects of
ﬁnancial control systems.
Extant research is therefore inconclusive with
regard to the role played by ﬁnancial measures in
causing short-termism. The mixed results might be
explained in at least two ways. The ﬁrst explanation
centres on the use of proxies to measure short-
termism. Two measures of short-term orientation
have traditionally been adopted. The ﬁrst measure
uses the instrument from Lawrence and Lorsch
(1967) which asks managers to assess the percent-
age of time devoted to working on issues that would
impact the proﬁt and loss statement within speciﬁed
time periods. The second measure, adopted by
Merchant (1990), is based upon a variable that
measures the discouragement of new ideas, as
represented by the effect of ﬁnancial controls on
expenditure for a range of discretionary items.
Merchant (1990) adopted both measures and
reported different results, with a strong statistical
association being reported for the relationship
between ﬁnancial control and the measure of
discouragement of new ideas; whilst the results
based upon the Lawrence and Lorsch measure were
‘barely statistically signiﬁcant’ (pp. 307–308).
These different results for the different proxies
may suggest the possibility that the proxies are
measuring different phenomena. The Lawrence and
Lorsch measure, in particular, appears to address
respondents’ attitudes towards the short term with-
out necessarily considering actions which entail an
inter-temporal trade-off; and short-termism in gen-
eral has proved to be difﬁcult to measure with any
precision (Laverty, 1996).
More recent measures of short-termism have
either adapted existing proxies or have adopted a
more direct measure of short-termism. For
example, Gibbs et al. (2004) used two separate
single item measures to assess different aspects of
short-termism: (1) the extent to which formula-
based performance measurement system encour-
aged managers to focus on the short-term; and (2)
the amount spent on training.3 Alternatively,
Marginson and McAulay (2008) developed an
instrument that asked managers to reveal the
extent to which they were prepared to sacriﬁce
long-term beneﬁts in order to meet short-term
performance targets. This instrument provides the
most direct attempt to operationalise short-termism
as an inter-temporal trade-off in favour of the short
term.
The second possible explanation for the mixed
results reported above is that existing studies
investigate the relationship between the importance
attached to ﬁnancial measures and short-termism
without differentiating among the alternative roles
that accounting based controls may play within the
ﬁrm. The roles of performance measures are
diverse. They include: creating a basis for dialogue,
legitimating and rationalising action (Burchell et
al., 1980); scorekeeping, attention directing and
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2 Otley deﬁned two groups of managers, designated B and C
based upon the ranking of two questionnaire items: ‘how well I
meet my budget’ and ‘how efﬁciently I run my unit’. Managers
in both groups ranked both items among their top three
performance criteria and thus maintained a balance between
budget and efﬁciency criteria.
3 The object of the study by Gibbs et al. (2004) was the
determinants of subjectivity in incentives. The authors expected
to ﬁnd that the short-term focus of quantitative measures would
lead to the use of subjectivity in determining levels of reward but
found a negative relationship contrary to expectations. In
contrast, for the measure of short-termism based upon the proxy
of long-term investments in intangibles, a positive relationship
was reported consistent with expectations.
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problem solving (Simon et al., 1954; Vandenbosch,
1999); enabling strategic change (Abernethy and
Brownell, 1999; Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Henri,
2006); and the roles of diagnostic and interactive
control (Simons, 1995, 2000). This latter approach
emphasises the importance of the ways in which
performance measures are used. Placing use at the
centre of the question of the causes of short-
termism, as contrasted with a long-term orientation
and strategy, is consistent with Simons’ (1990:
127) longstanding research agenda, which has
asked, ‘how do top managers actually use planning
and control systems to assist in the achievement of
organisational goals?’. The next section develops
the relationships between diagnostic and inter-
active use of performance measures and short-
termism.
3. Diagnostic and interactive utilisation of
performance measures
This section begins by outlining the nature of
diagnostic control. It then develops arguments,
based upon an extensive literature, that explain how
the diagnostic use of performance measures can be
linked to short-termism. The arguments lead to
hypotheses which are presented at the end of the
section.
3.1. Diagnostic utilisation of performance
measures and short-termism
Diagnostic control provides direction and motiv-
ation for goal achievement through a focus on
monitoring progress against key performance indi-
cators or ‘critical performance variables’ (i.e. those
factors enabling the achievement of intended strat-
egy – Henri, 2006: 5; Simons, 2005).This type of
control is a form of learning that entails single loop
feedback through which deviations from pre-set
standards of performance are corrected (Simons,
1995; Argyris, 1999; Otley, 1999; Vandenbosch,
1999; Henri, 2006). Diagnostic control thereby
facilitates management by exception (Widener,
2007). No action is taken where results and actions
accord to predetermined standards of performance;
and corrective action is restricted to situations
where outcomes do not meet expectations
(Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007). Although
diagnostic systems can lead to constructive out-
comes, they are also associated with negative
control where management by exception focuses
attention on mistakes and negative variances
(Henri, 2006).
The potential negative consequences can be
explained by elaborating a central aspect of
Argyris’ (1999) ‘theory of action’, in which organ-
isations and individuals take actions to accomplish
intended consequences, and learning is deﬁned as
the detection and correction of mismatches between
intentions and outcomes. In broad terms, actions
may be experienced directly through face-to-face
interactions or indirectly through expectations of
the anticipated responses of others (Luckmann,
2008). Where accounting information represents an
indirect experience, as in the case where diagnostic
control is an automatic process that supports
control-at-a-distance (see Simons, 1995: 70–71),
the kinds of actions that are encouraged by
performance measures may depend upon expect-
ations of the responses of others, particularly those
with higher status (Roberts, 1991). Performance
measurement systems thereby hold implications for
the self-esteem that arises from performing effect-
ively and individuals tend to act so as to maintain a
positive sense of self and to avoid feelings of
embarrassment, threat, vulnerability or incompe-
tence (Argyris, 1999: 135; also see pp. 131–133). In
order to maintain self-esteem and a positive sense of
self within a wider community, subordinates may
pursue actions which send superiors the message
superiors appear to want to receive or which reﬂect
the subordinates’ actions in the best possible
manner (Birnberg et al., 1983; Tetlock, 1992).
Actions reported by performance measurement
systems thereby have implications for the sense of
self and self-esteem which is built through the
expected responses of superiors (Hopwood, 1972;
Choudhury, 1986; Roberts, 1991).
In the case of diagnostic control systems, it
follows that subordinates may sometimes comply
with targets or report favourable variances in order
to maintain self-esteem even where the conse-
quences are detrimental to the ﬁrm in the longer
term. This kind of behaviour is an unintended and
dysfunctional consequence that has been classiﬁed
as a form of gaming and as a defensive behaviour,
which protects self by circumventing embarrass-
ment or threats to self-esteem (Hopwood, 1972;
Birnberg et al., 1983; Argyris, 1990). Gaming is
deﬁned as the act of selecting an activity so as to
achieve a favourable measure of performance ‘at the
expense of selecting an alternative course of action
that would result in a more desirable level of
performance so far as the superior’s true goal is
concerned’ (Birnberg et al., 1983: 122). Where the
‘true goal’ is wealth creation in the long term, short-
termism is a form of gaming; and Birnberg et al.
(1983) illustrate their deﬁnition of gaming through
an example which shows how managers can act so
as to beneﬁt the short term to the detriment of the
long term.
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Diagnostic control can be applied to any quan-
titative, numerically based measure(s) which permit
(s) the monitoring of performance against pre-set
standard(s) (Simons, 2005). Both ﬁnancial and non-
ﬁnancial measures may therefore be utilised
diagnostically (Simons, 1995). In the speciﬁc case
of the diagnostic use of non-ﬁnancial measures, the
possibility that such measures might represent
‘leading’ indicators of performance that draw
attention to the future (Sliwka, 2002) may become
secondary to the consequences of single loop
feedback and management by exception, in which
the focus is on conformity and maintaining the
status quo (Johnson and Gill, 1993; Argyris, 1999).
This possibility is implicit in Simons’ (1995: 81–84)
analysis of the potential dysfunctional conse-
quences of diagnostic control systems in which he
discusses examples drawn from the use of both
ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial measures. We therefore
hypothesise that:
H1: Increasing diagnostic use of ﬁnancial per-
formance measures is associated with increas-
ing short-termism.
H2: Increasing diagnostic use of non-ﬁnancial
performance measures is associated with
increasing short-termism.
3.2. Interactive use of performance measures and
rejection of short-termism
Where predictable goal achievement justiﬁes the
use of diagnostic control, interactive control is
designed to encourage creativity and innovation
(Simons, 1995). To this end, interactive control
stimulates the development of new ideas and
initiatives and guides the bottom-up emergence of
strategies (Simons, 1995; Henri, 2006: 5). The role
of senior managers in this case is to promote
evolution and adaptation, stimulate the emergence
of new strategies, and encourage subordinates to
challenge the status quo and to ﬁnd new solutions to
old problems (Roberts, 1991: 366; Simons, 1995,
2005). Where diagnostic control is concerned with
automatic processes and control-at-a-distance,
interactive control presents opportunities for senior
managers to become personally involved in the
decision-making of subordinates (Simons, 1995).
Senior managers discuss performance measures in
face to face meetings in ways that encourage debate
and allow subordinates to challenge assumptions
and action plans (Simons, 1995). Interactive control
thereby supports dialogue about strategic uncer-
tainties by reﬂecting signals sent by top managers
through their use of performance measures
(Simons, 1995; Henri, 2006).The interactive use
of performance measures therefore represents a
positive control force which seeks to expand
opportunity-seeking and learning throughout the
organisation (Henri, 2006: 5).
There are two interlinking sets of reasons why
short-termism can be avoided through the use of
interactive control. First, interactive control is
forward-looking and is characterised by the contin-
ual challenging and debate of underlying data
(Simons, 1995; Widener, 2007). Interactive control
is therefore consistent with double-loop learning
through which systems are controlled not only
through changing actions and but also by revising
objectives and assumptions (Argyris, 1999;
Simons, 1995: 106). Double-loop learning allows
companies to ‘control the long-range effectiveness,
and hence, the ultimate destiny of the system’
(Argyris, 1999: 69). Double-loop learning also
avoids the embarrassment and threat that can be
associated with single-loop learning (Argyris, 1990:
508; 1999). Interactive control can therefore lead to
the avoidance of short-termism through double-
loop learning that promotes a long-term orientation
and avoids the defensive behaviour that can arise
from diagnostic control.
The second reason is based on the claim that
managers’ short-termism is associated with efforts
to optimise current reported results to the detriment
of strategic activities (Sliwka, 2002). Short-termism
has thus become equivalent to neglecting strategy;
where by deﬁnition, short-termism undervalues the
long term. Laverty (2004: 951) argues that, ‘in order
to avoid undervaluing the long-term, ﬁrms must
create processes that allow and encourage employ-
ees to understand the opportunities the future
presents and how the ﬁrm’s strategies work to
take advantage of those opportunities’. The inter-
active use of performance measures may contribute
to such processes. Interactive control has a positive
effect on the long-term capabilities of innovative-
ness, entrepreneurship, learning and market orien-
tation (Simons, 1995) and may consequently give
rise to product innovation and encourage new ideas
(Bisbe and Otley, 2004). The interactive use of
performance measures is essential to the learning
and adaptation which underpins the development of
strategy (Abernethy and Brownell, 1999; Simons,
2005). Interactive control therefore encourages
strategic activities, thereby promoting a long-term
orientation. Where a long-term orientation is con-
ceived as lying on a continuum and at the opposite
extreme to short-termism, the interactive use of
performance measures may be negatively associ-
ated with short-termism.
With regard to the choice of performance meas-
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 2/8/2010 03 ABR Marginson.3d Page 357 of 370
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ures, the use of non-ﬁnancial measures is essential
to strategy and encourages ﬁrms to undertake
initiatives that are consistent with long-term stra-
tegic objectives (Kaplan and Norton, 1996, 2000).
Non-ﬁnancial measures are particularly valuable
where ‘the long-term effect of a strategic task is
sufﬁciently high’ (Sliwka, 2002: 514); and non-
ﬁnancial measures discourage managers from
‘stealing from tomorrow’ (Hodak, 2005). These
arguments suggest that the interactive use of non-
ﬁnancial measures alone will be sufﬁcient to
discourage short-termism. However, Simons
(2005) stresses that it is the interactive use of
information per se which is important to its strategic
effect; and ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial measures can
be equally effective in this regard. Indeed, ﬁnancial
measures may even support strategic activity
(Bhimani and Langﬁeld-Smith, 2007). We therefore
hypothesise:
H3: Increasing interactive use of ﬁnancial meas-
ures is negatively associated with short-
termism.
H4: Increasing interactive use of non-ﬁnancial
measures is negatively associated with short-
termism.
3.3. The joint utilisation of ﬁnancial and non-
ﬁnancial measures and short-termism
Firms are known to use diagnostic and interactive
controls jointly rather than individually (Simons,
1995, 2005; Henri, 2006; Widener, 2007). The
motivation behind combining diagnostic and inter-
active controls is to create the dynamic tension
between predictable goal achievement and creative
innovation which is essential to the creation of
beneﬁcial effects for the ﬁrm (Simons, 1995, 2000;
Lillis, 2002; Marginson, 2002; Henri, 2006). It is
therefore important to extend the analysis beyond
the effects of diagnostic and interactive use of
ﬁnancial and performance measures as represented
by hypotheses 1–4 to consider the combination of
diagnostic and interactive controls. Different forms
of combination are theoretically plausible and both
moderating and matching forms of ﬁt can be
supported in theoretical terms.4
Moderation is a form of ﬁt where the effect of an
independent variable X1 on the dependent variable
Y is conditional on the value of a second independ-
ent variable X2 and variables X1 and X2 do not
inﬂuence each other (Venkatraman, 1989; Luft and
Shields, 2003; Gerdin and Greve, 2004). The
moderation form of ﬁt is appropriate where claims
for the efﬁcacy of combining measures are based
upon the possibility that short-termism can be
avoided where interactive control moderates the
effect on short-termism that is caused by diagnostic
control. Six interaction terms result from an analysis
of the possible combinations of diagnostic and
interactive use of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial meas-
ures and these are shown in Figure 1. It can be seen
from Figure 1 that one combination relates entirely
to the diagnostic use of performance measures. The
diagnostic use of performance measures can be
associated with short-termism where short-termism
is a form of gaming or a defensive routine. This
argument, which supports hypotheses 1–2, gives
rise to the following hypothesis:
H5a: Combining (increasing) diagnostic use of
ﬁnancial measures with (increasing) diag-
nostic use of non-ﬁnancial measures
increases short-termism.
Combinations numbered 2–5 in Figure 1 combine
diagnostic and interactive use of ﬁnancial and non-
ﬁnancial measures in different ways. Combining
diagnostic and interactive uses leads to dynamic
tension that is beneﬁcial to the ﬁrm (Simons, 1995;
Henri, 2006). Henri (2006) draws upon a varied
literature to argue that dynamic tension encourages
dialogue and creativity and positively inﬂuences the
strategic capabilities of market orientation, entre-
preneurship, innovativeness and organisational
learning. It was argued earlier that processes that
are supportive of strategic activities promote a long-
term orientation. It follows from this that combining
diagnostic and interactive control should be nega-
tively associated with short-termism.
H5b: Combining (increasing) diagnostic use of
ﬁnancial or non-ﬁnancial measures with
(increasing) interactive use of ﬁnancial or
non-ﬁnancial measures decreases short-
termism.
The ﬁnal type of combination presented in Figure 1
relates to the interactive use of both ﬁnancial and
non-ﬁnancial measures. Interactive use is likely to
be strategic and to avoid defensive behaviour, as
argued in the development of hypotheses 3 and 4.
We therefore present the following hypothesis:
H5c: Combining (increasing) interactive use of
ﬁnancial measures with (increasing) inter-
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4 The third kind of ﬁt which is widely adopted is mediation.
Mediation is inappropriate in this case because there must be a
causal relationship between the independent variables for
mediation to be appropriate (Gerdin and Greve, 2004). There
is no argument in the literature to suggest that any type of use of
ﬁnancial measures gives rise in causal terms to any type of use
of non-ﬁnancial measures.
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active use of non-ﬁnancial measures
decreases short-termism.
The matching form of ﬁt applies where the theor-
etically deﬁned relationship between independent
variables may be established without regard to the
dependent variable (Venkatraman, 1989). The ﬁt
between the independent variables should be cap-
able of theoretical elucidation, as in the case of the
concept of the balanced scorecard where the ﬁt, or
balance, between different types of ﬁnancial and
non-ﬁnancial measures is a recognisable construct
that is independent of the effects on potential
dependent variables. The matching form of ﬁt can
be shown to be relevant to combinations involving
both diagnostic and interactive controls and ﬁnan-
cial and non-ﬁnancial measures.
Taking combinations of diagnostic and inter-
active controls initially, two arguments are relevant.
First, diagnostic use of performance measurement
systems ‘ensures that the positive effects of inter-
active use’ can be realised (Henri, 2006: 537;
emphasis added); and ‘increasing the emphasis on
one control component increases the beneﬁts
received from increasing the emphasis on other
control components’ (Widener, 2007: 760). If the
interactive system is to deliver strategic beneﬁts, it
follows that support must be provided through the
appropriate level of use of the diagnostic system.
The second argument is based upon Henri’s (2006:
538) hypothesis that links ‘a balanced use’ of
diagnostic and interactive use of performance
measurement systems and positive strategic cap-
abilities. The closer the balance or ﬁt in terms of the
use of diagnostic and interactive performance
measures, then the greater the positive strategic
implications. Given that short-termism is equivalent
to the neglect of strategic activities, two conse-
quences arise from these arguments: (1) imbalance
can be expected to be less than optimal, and may
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Figure 1
Interaction terms for combinations of diagnostic and/or interactive use of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial
measures which increase short-termism (combination 1) or which decrease short-termism
(combinations 2–6)
Type of combination Description
H5a Combining (increasing) diagnostic use of ﬁnancial measures
with (increasing) diagnostic use of non-ﬁnancial measures increases
short-termism.
1. Diagnostic use Diagnostic use of ﬁnancial measures
6 diagnostic use of non-ﬁnancial
measures
H5b Combining (increasing) diagnostic use of ﬁnancial or non-
ﬁnancial measures with (increasing) interactive use of ﬁnancial or
non-ﬁnancial measures decreases short-termism.
2. Diagnostic combined with interactive use Diagnostic use of ﬁnancial measures
6 interactive use of ﬁnancial
measures
3. Diagnostic combined with interactive use Diagnostic use of ﬁnancial measures
6 interactive use of non-ﬁnancial
measures
4. Diagnostic combined with interactive use Diagnostic use of non-ﬁnancial
measures6 interactive use of
ﬁnancial measures
5. Diagnostic combined with interactive use Diagnostic use of non-ﬁnancial
measures6 interactive use of non-
ﬁnancial measures
H5c Combining (increasing) interactive use of ﬁnancial measures
with (increasing) interactive use of non-ﬁnancial measures decreases
short-termism.
6. Interactive use Interactive use of ﬁnancial measures
6 interactive use of non-ﬁnancial
measures
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even be dysfunctional, and will occur if the effect of
diagnostic use of performance measures exceeds
the effect of interactive use (and vice versa); and (2)
given the arguments that supported hypotheses 1–4,
an imbalance in favour of diagnostic vis-à-vis
interactive use of performance measures will lead to
short-termism. These arguments may be applied to
both ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial performance meas-
ures on the basis that Simons (1995) argues that it is
the ways in which performance measures are used
which is of key signiﬁcance. We hypothesise that:
H6a: Increasing imbalance in favour of diagnostic
use over interactive use of both ﬁnancial and
non-ﬁnancial measures is associated with
increasing short-termism.
The matching concept of ﬁt also applies in the case
of ﬁnancial versus non-ﬁnancial measures. The
balance between ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial meas-
ures is fundamental to the impact of the balanced
scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). In terms of
the impact of these measures taken in isolation,
ﬁnancial measures reﬂect past and current activities
and have been classiﬁed as lagging indicators of
performance (Kaplan and Norton, 1996; Banker et
al., 2000; Sliwka, 2002). Non-ﬁnancial perform-
ance measures are considered to be leading indica-
tors in the sense that they have predictive value for
future ﬁnancial results (Kaplan and Norton 1996,
2000; Banker et al., 2000). Firms have been shown
to use more non-ﬁnancial measures when they have
adopted more long-term orientated strategies
(i.e. innovation or prospector types of strategy;
Ittner et al., 1997; Said et al., 2003; HassabElnaby et
al., 2005). In terms of the balance or ﬁt between
different types of performance measures, non-
ﬁnancial measures augment ﬁnancial measures in
order to provide a diverse set of measures which
provide strategic information when presented as a
combined package (Ittner, Larcker and Randall,
2003). Since combining performance measures so
as to ensure an appropriate ﬁt between ﬁnancial and
non-ﬁnancial measures supports strategy, and since
strategic activity is counter to short-termism, it
follows that short-termism may result from a failure
to combine measures in a balanced way. In
particular, underweighting non-ﬁnancial measures
undermines the objectives of the balanced scorecard
(Lipe and Salterio, 2000), and thus weakens its
strategic impact and makes it more likely that short-
termism will result. An imbalance in favour of
ﬁnancial measures may over-emphasise the past
and present; and at the extreme it is the sole use of
ﬁnancial measures that has traditionally been asso-
ciated with short-termism (e.g. Ittner, Larcker and
Meyer, 2003). Given that the balanced scorecard
can be used either diagnostically or interactively
(Simons, 2005: 142), the following hypothesis can
be stated:
H6b: Increasing imbalance in favour of the use of
ﬁnancial measures over non-ﬁnancial meas-
ures for both diagnostic and interactive
control is associated with increasing short-
termism.
4. Method
We tested our hypotheses within the telecommuni-
cations industry, drawing respondents from
Comtel,5 a major organisation within this globalised
industry. The study of telecommunications ﬁrms is
particularly apposite to developing our understand-
ing of short-termism because such ﬁrms need to
sustain a high rate of strategic adaptation and
change in order to prosper in the long term and yet
face intense competition which endangers their
short-term survival (Dutton et al., 1997). The use of
a single ﬁrm for the sample is both a strength and a
weakness. Single-site research enables us to focus
upon the use of performance measurement systems
and to assume consistency of factors which may
independently affect the behaviour of respondents.
The factors which remain consistent across the
present analysis include: organisational size and
competencies, performance measurement and
reward systems, and organisational strategy. The
single site limits our ability to make claims for
generalisability. However, drawing respondents
from a single organisation is not uncommon in the
literature. For example, Brownell (1981), Hopwood
(1972) and Otley (1978) have all drawn on single-
organisation settings to examine the use of per-
formance measures.
Data were collected via a questionnaire survey
distributed to the senior divisional managers of
Comtel in the spring/summer of 2006. Two hundred
and eighty-four questionnaires were distributed
electronically and 100 usable responses were
obtained. The response rate was 35.2%. Non-
response bias was assessed on the basis of the
familiar assumption that non-respondents are more
likely to be similar to late respondents than early
respondents (Fowler, 1993). A two-sample t-test
showed signiﬁcant differences in mean values for
only age (p<0.05) and diagnostic use of non-
ﬁnancial measures (p<0.05). Given the importance
of the latter of these two variables in the study, the
analysis was also conducted using the separate
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 2/8/2010 03 ABR Marginson.3d Page 360 of 370
5 A ﬁctitious name is used to respect conﬁdentiality.
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groups of early versus late respondents. No signiﬁ-
cantly different results were found compared to the
composite group of respondents.
Questionnaire instruments were pre-tested and
piloted prior to the main study. Two of the research
team who were not involved in developing the
questionnaire were asked to assess the question-
naire instruments for ambiguity, style of question
and length. The revised questionnaire was then
distributed to MBA students studying in the USA
and in New Zealand. 45 completed questionnaires
were returned in total from these two groups.
Responses were analysed using conﬁrmatory factor
analysis, scaling, and correlation analysis.
Comments made by respondents were also
reviewed. These processes led to the research
instruments being revised. The ﬁnal version of
each instrument is described below.
5. Measurement instruments
Short-termism
A six-item instrument (reduced to three following
principal component factor analysis) was devised to
capture short-termism (see items 1–6 in the
Appendix). The six-item instrument contained
three questions based upon the Marginson and
McAulay (2008) instrument that provides a direct
measure of short-termism as an inter-temporal
trade-off and three questions that were reverse
scored and which sought to represent a long-term
orientation. Factor analysis results shown in Table 1
reveal a two-factor solution. The three items
designed to measure short-termism (questions 1–3)
clearly load onto a separate factor. A Cronbach
Alpha of 0.68 was obtained for this three-item
instrument which was used in the analysis. The
measure of long-term orientation was included in
exploratory analysis but no signiﬁcant ﬁndings
resulted and the analysis is not presented here.
Diagnostic/interactive use of ﬁnancial and non-
ﬁnancial measures
We adopted the instruments used by Henri (2006) to
measure respondents’ diagnostic and interactive use
of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial measures, with minor
changes to wording being introduced after pre- and
pilot testing. Two separate instruments were
developed, each comprising 11 items, with four
items representing diagnostic use and seven items
representing interactive use, as shown in the
Appendix (items 7–17). Two sections of the ques-
tionnaire were designed to independently assess
responses to ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial measures.
We employed conﬁrmatory factor analysis to
check the existence of separate variables for the
diagnostic and interactive use of ﬁnancial and non-
ﬁnancial measures. Principal component factor
analysis conﬁrmed the existence of separate sub-
dimensions of diagnostic and interactive use for the
non-ﬁnancial instrument, but not for the ﬁnancial
instrument. Table 2 shows that all items for the
ﬁnancial instrument load onto a single factor. This
may be interpreted as suggesting that ﬁnancial
measures were used at Comtel in order to combine
diagnostic and interactive use in theoretically
justiﬁable ways.6 We established separate instru-
ments for diagnostic and interactive use of ﬁnancial
and non-ﬁnancial measures according to theory.
Cronbach alpha scores were 0.87 or greater (see
rows 2–5 of Table 3). Given the results of the factor
analysis, we also conducted additional analysis
using an instrument comprising all 11 items for the
ﬁnancial measure. The results of this analysis are
not presented in the paper, but are available on
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Table 1
Factor analysis results for short-term trade-off
Factor 1 Factor 2 Communalities
Item 1a 0.779 –0.095 0.616
Item 2 0.802 –0.120 0.657
Item 3 0.694 0.284 0.629
Item 4 0.494 0.307 0.339
Item 5 0.004 0.771 0.596
Item 6 0.008 0.680 0.462
Eigen values 1.977 1.321
Explained variance 34.74% 20.23%
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of sampling adequacy = 0.647
aItems 1–6 are presented in the Appendix.
6We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this
possibility. The implication is that the level of dynamic tension
or balance between diagnostic and interactive uses of ﬁnancial
measures gave rise to a single factor.
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request. They conﬁrm the results of the analysis
which is reported.
Diagnostic-interactive and ﬁnancial-non-ﬁnancial
imbalance measures
In order to test for the matching concept of ﬁt,
variables were created based upon the absolute
difference between the standardised scores of the
original variables, using the mean as the basis for
standardisation (see Alexander and Randolph,
1985; Venkatraman, 1989). The four variables,
which are treated as new variables that are inde-
pendent of the variables upon which they are based
(Alexander and Randolph, 1985), were paired as
follows: (1) the difference between diagnostic and
interactive use of ﬁnancial measures was paired
with (2) the difference between diagnostic and
interactive use of non-ﬁnancial measures; and (3)
the difference between the diagnostic use of ﬁnan-
cial and non-ﬁnancial measures was paired with (4)
the difference between the interactive use of
ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial measures. Hypothesis
6a relates to (1) and (2) and is concerned with the
imbalance between diagnostic and interactive use.
Hypothesis 6b relates to (3) and (4) and is
concerned with the imbalance between the use of
ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial measures. Cronbach
alpha scores are not available because the four
variables are single item measures.
Control variables
To reduce the likelihood that demographic charac-
teristics would confound responses to short-
termism, three characteristics were measured and
controlled for in the analysis: age, gender, and level
of education. These may inﬂuence managerial
beliefs, values, opinions, and actions (Knight et
al., 1999), and may thus inﬂuence managers’ time
horizons. We also controlled for hierarchical level,
given Jaques’ (1990) argument that hierarchy
supports diverse temporal orientations, with senior
managers providing a long-term orientation.
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Table 2
Factor analysis results for ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial instruments
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Communalities
FD Track progress towards goals 0.885 –0.049 0.099 0.796
FI Encourage discussions 0.859 0.068 0.004 0.743
FD Monitor results 0.885 –0.159 0.195 0.847
FD Compare outcomes to experience 0.906 –0.029 0.131 0.838
FI Encourage continual challenge 0.835 0.230 0.023 0.750
FI Provide a common view 0.830 0.168 –0.145 0.738
FD Review key measures 0.870 –0.029 0.140 0.777
FI Tie the organisation together 0.797 0.170 –0.094 0.673
FI Focus on common issues 0.874 0.038 0.034 0.766
FI Develop common vocabulary 0.846 0.034 –0.073 0.721
FI Focus on critical success factors 0.841 0.002 0.137 0.726
NFD Track progress toward goals 0.115 0.412 0.711 0.689
NFI Encourage discussions 0.020 0.764 0.362 0.715
NFI Develop common vocabulary 0.097 0.784 0.254 0.688
NFD Monitor results 0.006 0.405 0.660 0.643
NFI Provide a common view 0.075 0.796 0.074 0.645
NFI Tie the organisation together 0.189 0.771 0.095 0.640
NFD Compare outcomes to experience 0.058 0.371 0.781 0.752
NFI Encourage continual challenge –0.008 0.768 0.236 0.646
NFD Review key measures 0.082 0.316 0.786 0.724
NFI Focus on common issues –0.060 0.783 0.255 0.682
NFI Focus on critical success factors –0.055 0.797 0.361 0.768
Eigen values 8.55 6.11 1.31
Explained variance 37.14% 22.85% 12.60%
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of sampling adequacy = 0.884
FD = Financial diagnostic
FI = Financial interactive
NFD = Non-ﬁnancial diagnostic
NFI = Non-ﬁnancial interactive
362 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 19
:17
 03
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
6. Analysis and results
Table 3 reports means, standard deviations,
Cronbach alphas and Pearson correlation coefﬁ-
cients. Tests for multicollinearity among the main
effects variables revealed, for ﬁnancial measures,
variance inﬂation factors of approximately 2.70 and
tolerances of approximately 0.37. For non-ﬁnancial
measures, both variance inﬂation factors and toler-
ances were well within acceptable limits (<2.0 and
> 0.50 respectively). Overall, test results suggest no
signiﬁcant problems in terms of using multiple
regression to test hypotheses 1–4 (Belsley et al.,
1980). In the case of hypothesis 6, two approaches
were adopted (based upon Alexander and
Randolph, 1985): (1) measures of imbalance were
included with the main effects variables; and (2)
measures of imbalance were modelled independ-
ently of the main effects variables, giving rise to
three models, which: (a) include all four variables;
(b) include variables related to imbalance between
diagnostic and interactive use; and (c) include
variables related to imbalance between ﬁnancial and
non-ﬁnancial measures. Only in the case of the
model containing the two variables related to
imbalance between diagnostic and interactive use
(2b) were tests for multicollinearity acceptable
(variance inﬂation factors and tolerances were 0.5
respectively).
We applied Harman’s single-factor test by
conducting conﬁrmatory factor analysis using
principal component factor analysis involving the
main effects variables in order to test for the
possibility of common response bias (Podsakoff et
al., 2003). Responses for ﬁnancial measures load
onto one instead of two factors, but generally
factor loadings for all variables examined in this
study correspond with their theoretical constructs.
Neither item misspeciﬁcation nor cross-loading is a
problem.
6.1. Test of hypotheses
We tested hypotheses 1–4 using hierarchical mul-
tiple regression analysis (Hartmann and Moers,
1999). Three models were developed. The ﬁrst
model contains the control variables only. Model 2
adds the measures for diagnostic and interactive use
of ﬁnancial measures. Model 3 adds the measures
for diagnostic and interactive use of non-ﬁnancial
measures. Results are reported in Table 4.
The results shown in Table 4 suggest that,
whether used diagnostically or interactively,
increasing use of ﬁnancial measures may have no
effect on short-termism. Neither hypothesis 1 nor
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics, including Pearson correlation coefﬁcients
Variable Mean SD CA Theo Act 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. ST 11.12 1.90 0.68 3–15 6–15 –
2. FD 14.79 4.36 0.95 4–20 4–20 0.07 –
3. FI 20.22 6.28 0.94 5–30 5–30 0.09 0.86 –
4. NFD 15.96 2.72 0.87 4–20 6–20 0.03 0.17 0.13 –
5. NFI 23.84 4.11 0.90 6–30 9–30 0.27 0.08 0.16 0.66 –
6. D-I F 0.32 0.59 n/a –4-+4 –2.1-+1.83 –0.03 0.35 –0.20 0.05 –0.15 –
7. D-I NF 0.02 0.56 n/a –4-+4 –2.0-+1.67 –0.35 –0.02 0.04 0.15 0.75 0.25 –
8. D F-NF 0.29 1.19 n/a –4-+4 –3.8-+1.82 0.08 0.83 0.70 –0.43 –0.32 0.29 –0.14 –
9. I F-NF 0.60 1.16 n/a –4-+4 –4.0-+2.00 –0.07 0.72 0.81 –0.28 –0.45 –0.09 0.22 0.82 –
SD = Standard deviation
CA = Cronbach Alpha
Theo = Theoretical range
Act = Actual range
ST = Short-termism
FD = Diagnostic use of ﬁnancial measures
FI = Interactive use of ﬁnancial measures
NFD = Diagnostic use of non-ﬁnancial measures
NFI = Interactive use of non-ﬁnancial measures
D-I F = Net difference between diagnostic vis-à-vis interactive utilisation of ﬁnancial measures
D-I NF = Net difference between diagnostic vis-à-vis interactive utilisation of non-ﬁnancial measures
D F-NF = Net difference between diagnostic utilisation of ﬁnancial vis-à-vis non-ﬁnancial measures
I F-NF = Net difference between interactive utilisation of ﬁnancial vis-à-vis non-ﬁnancial measures
Correlations above 0.19 signiﬁcant at p < 0.05
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hypothesis 3 is supported. In contrast, the use of
non-ﬁnancial measures both diagnostically and
interactively is found to be associated with man-
agers’ inter-temporal trade-off choices. The greater
the importance that is attached to the diagnostic use
of non-ﬁnancial measures, the greater managers’
short-termism. Increasing interactive use of non-
ﬁnancial measures is negatively associated with
short-termism. Hypotheses 2 and 4 are therefore
supported.
Hypotheses 5a, 5b and 5c predict that interaction
terms will be associated either positively or nega-
tively with short-termism. All six interaction terms
in Figure 1 were added to Model 3 to produce the
ﬁrst analysis. Each of the interaction terms was
independently added, in turn, to Model 3 as the
basis for subsequent analysis. For instance, for one
analysis, we included a product term which repre-
sented the joint effect of diagnostic use of ﬁnancial
measures and interactive use of non-ﬁnancial
measures (combination 3, Figure 1). None of the
interaction terms was signiﬁcant. The hypotheses
(5a, 5b, 5c) are not supported.
Hypothesis 6a predicts that, for both ﬁnancial and
non-ﬁnancial measures, an imbalance in favour of
diagnostic use will lead to short-termism. Table 5
presents the regression model for these two vari-
ables. The results of Table 5 suggest that for
ﬁnancial measures, an imbalance in favour of
diagnostic use is not associated with managers’
inter-temporal trade-off choices. However, for non-
ﬁnancial measures, an imbalance in favour of
diagnostic use is associated with short-termism.
H6a is partially supported.
Hypothesis 6b predicts that, for both diagnostic
and interactive use, an imbalance in favour of
ﬁnancial measures will lead to short-termism.
Table 3 shows that the correlations between the
two imbalance measures are not signiﬁcantly cor-
related with short-termism. Hypothesis 6b cannot
be supported.
7. Discussion and conclusions
Short-termism was apparent at our research site and
one aim in developing this study was to explore
theoretical explanations and empirical tests to
account for such behaviour. Our results do not
support the enduring orthodoxy that ﬁnancial
measures create short-termism, and nor do our
results support the proposition that using non-
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Table 4
Predictor variables regressed on short-termism
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Control variables:
Age
Gender
Education
Hierarchical level
0.092
0.094
–0.089
–0.028
0.107
0.082
–0.082
–0.040
0.036
0.072
–0.051
–0.010
Financial measures:
Diagnostic use (–ve)a
Interactive use (+ve)
–0.121
0.190
0.064
0.017
Non-ﬁnancial measures:
Diagnostic use (–ve)
Interactive use (+ve)
**–0.378**
***0.509***
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.046 ***0.103***
Incremental Adj. R2 0.036 **0.057**
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standardised regression coefﬁcients reported
aThe predicted signs reﬂect the polarity of the dependent variable, for which a low score = trade-off in
favour of the short-term. An increasing emphasis on the use of diagnostic and interactive measures is
represented by a higher score. Thus, we would expect to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative relationship between
increasing diagnostic control and short-termism, and a signiﬁcant positive relationship for increasing
interactive control and short-termism.
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ﬁnancial measures will impact the short-termism
caused by ﬁnancial measures. Contrary to the
proposition that non-ﬁnancial measures discourage
the short-termism that is associated with ﬁnancial
measures (e.g. Ittner and Larcker, 1998; Sliwka,
2002; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007), our
ﬁndings suggest that it is not ﬁnancial or non-
ﬁnancial measures per se which affect short-
termism, but the way in which performance meas-
ures are used. It seems that non-ﬁnancial measures
can create short-termism where they are used
diagnostically; whilst the interactive use of non-
ﬁnancial measures may be negatively associated
with short-termism.
Our study explored the impact of combinations
of diagnostic and interactive uses of ﬁnancial and
non-ﬁnancial measures. Two forms of ﬁt were
tested. No signiﬁcant results were found for the
moderating effect of non-ﬁnancial measures. This
appears to be consistent with Henri’s (2006) ﬁnding
of no overall association between dynamic tension
and strategic capabilities. Only partial support for
the concept of matching was found. As in the case
of the analysis of the main effects, no association
was found between the imbalance between the
diagnostic and interactive use of ﬁnancial measures
and it was only in the case of non-ﬁnancial
measures that an imbalance in favour of diagnostic
use was associated with short-termism.
The differences between the ﬁndings for ﬁnancial
and non-ﬁnancial measures are surprising. If diag-
nostic use provides an explanation for short-
termism, it might be expected that the diagnostic
use of ﬁnancial measures would be associated with
short-termism.
In general, there does not appear to be a
compelling reason to explain this difference in
terms of the characteristics of performance meas-
ures. Financial measures, such as return on capital
employed, may emphasise the short-term, accord-
ing to the orthodox view, or may equally be
important for strategy and a long-term orientation
(Bhimani and Langﬁeld-Smith, 2007). Financial
measures such as the price–earnings ratio include
share price data and may drive an external, future,
and strategic orientation. In contrast, measures
relating to costs and current assets, including
cost–income ratios, productivity ratios, stock turn-
over and the current ratio, appear to be short-term in
orientation. Yet, equally, non-ﬁnancial measures
such as customer satisfaction or delivery time may
encourage either a long-term or a short-term
orientation. It therefore appears that further work
may be needed to consider ways in which speciﬁc
measures are used. For instance, a measure of
quality used diagnostically may focus attention on
the short-term, even where there are long-term
issues, whilst a measure of new product develop-
ment, even when used diagnostically, may encour-
age a long-term orientation.7 The possible
consequence is the need for future research to go
beyond the general categories of ﬁnancial versus
non-ﬁnancial to consider how speciﬁc types of
performance measures, when used diagnostically,
may lead to short-termism.
An alternative explanation may be found in the
argument that short-termism is a form of gaming
and a defensive response that serves to preserve
self-esteem. Based upon Argyris’ (1999) theory of
action, it was argued earlier in this paper that short-
termism may enable individuals to preserve a
positive sense of self through the pursuit of actions
that subordinates believe send messages that super-
iors wish to receive. The link between short-
termism and ﬁnancial measures is therefore pre-
mised on the assumption that superiors wish to
receive messages communicated in ﬁnancial terms.
In some situations this may not be the case. For
Comtel, for instance, discussions with senior man-
agers revealed that the company: (1) accorded low
priority to ﬁnancial targets at the departmental level
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Table 5
Results for regression models based upon the matching concept of ﬁt, short-termism as the dependent
variable
Variable Standardised regression coefﬁcient t-statistic
Diagnostic – Interactive
imbalance: ﬁnancial measures
0.045 0.590
Diagnostic – Interactive
imbalance: non-ﬁnancial measures
–0.352 –3.501***
Adjusted R2 = 0.108**
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
7We thank an anonymous reviewer for encouraging us to
adopt the form of analysis presented throughout this paragraph.
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following experiences consistent with the dysfunc-
tional effects outlined in the beyond budgeting
literature (see Hope and Fraser, 2003); and (2)
stressed the importance of non-ﬁnancial measures
in pursuit of a policy based upon the principles of
beyond budgeting. There was therefore little if any
motivation at the divisional level for managers to
maintain self-esteem or to act defensively in terms
of the ﬁnancial performance measurement system.
In contrast, non-ﬁnancial measures were empha-
sised within the organisation, and so it might be
expected that departmental managers who were
short-termist would be managers for whom diag-
nostic control was important in relation to their use
of non-ﬁnancial measures.
The ﬁndings presented here are premised on the
assumption that the short-term is deﬁned as a period
of one year. Discussion is required on this point
because, whilst this assumption is consistent with
prior studies, it is possible that there may be
industry level drivers that lead to alternative
deﬁnitions of the short-term.8 Time horizons may
also vary according to the responsibility time span
of the role (the time required to complete the longest
project/task assigned to the role; Jaques, 1990).
There is therefore scope to elaborate on the nature of
managerial time horizons and we explored two
possibilities through further analysis, based on
regression analysis and clustering (Everitt, 2001).
One is that the utilisation of ﬁnancial and non-
ﬁnancial measures may be linked to how managers
deﬁne the short term. The other is that deﬁnitions of
what constitute the short term may underpin the
relationship between ﬁnancial/non-ﬁnancial meas-
ure utilisation and short-termism. We found no
association between how the short term is deﬁned
and how ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial measures are
used. In contrast, analysis of deﬁnitions of the short
term based upon time horizons of 3, 6, 12 and 18
months conﬁrm the main ﬁndings but stress the role
of a time horizon of < 6 months as a basis for the
associations between diagnostic and interactive
uses of non-ﬁnancial measures and short-termism.9
We conclude that future studies may beneﬁt from
including the time horizons of managers in their
analysis.
There is also scope for future studies which build
upon our ﬁndings in other contexts and which
address the relationship between the diagnostic and
interactive utilisation of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial
measures and short-termism. Studies where ﬁnan-
cial measures remain organisationally important at
the divisional level would be particularly important
in testing the proposition that short-termism is a
form of defensive behaviour that results from the
support given by diagnostic use to single loop
feedback systems. In single site contexts where
ﬁnancial measures are balanced by non-ﬁnancial
measures at the organisational level we might
expect that diagnostic use per se and/or imbalance
in favour of diagnostic use will lead to short-
termism. Alternatively, cross sectional studies
across ﬁrms may reveal that diagnostic use and/or
imbalance in favour of diagnostic use explain short-
termism irrespective of the types of measures
adopted. Such studies may consider the impact of
industry type; especially due to a limitation of the
present study in pursuing a company based within
the telecommunications industry, where the prior-
itisation of non-ﬁnancial measures over ﬁnancial
measures may be a feature of the industry due to the
impact of regulations that stress the importance of
safety and customer satisfaction (Ittner et al., 1997).
The research presented here is exploratory and
this implies that there are limitations that future
research can address. First, the generalisability of
the results is limited by the use of respondents from
a single organisation. As suggested in the previous
paragraph, there is a research opportunity to be
gained from pursuing the hypotheses across a range
of companies. Second, common method bias may
not be totally discounted through the use of
Harman’s single factor test and remedial strategies
are available whichmay be adopted in future studies
(see Podsakoff et al., 2003). The third limitation
relates to the development of Marginson and
McAulay’s (2008) measure of short-termism. This
supports a deﬁnition of short-termism that appears
to provide valuable research potential; but the
measure relating to a long-term orientation requires
further development if there are to be future tests of
the claims for the long-term orientation that might
result from the interactive use of either ﬁnancial or
non-ﬁnancial performance measures. Fourth is the
limitation that both reverse causality and endogene-
ity may apply; unobserved variables may cause
short-termism which in turn causes managers to
employ ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial measures in
different ways. Fifth, the explanatory power of our
regression models indicates that there are poten-
tially many other variables which we did not
examine in our study but which may motivate
managers to adopt a short-term orientation. In
particular, this study did not seek to investigate
factors such as capital market pressure, reward
schemes, culture, trust, role ambiguity and social
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 2/8/2010 03 ABR Marginson.3d Page 366 of 370
8We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting
this possibility.
9 Details are available on request.
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inﬂuence, which may explain short-termism
(Laverty, 1996; 2004; Marginson and McAulay,
2008).10 Likewise, this study did not consider the
impacts of culture and environmental uncertainty
that Henri (2006) has shown to be necessary to
understanding the impacts of the dynamic tension
created by the combined use of diagnostic and
interactive performance measurement systems.
A ﬁnal limitation is that this paper is consistent
with others of its type in conﬂating management
control systems and performance measurement
systems research through the adoption of phrases
such as ‘diagnostic use of performance measure-
ment systems’ and ‘interactive use of performance
measurement systems’ (see, for instance, Henri,
2006, for a further example of a paper that draws
from both management control and performance in
this way).11 Clearly, management control systems
and performance measurement systems each have
their own traditions and it would not be correct to
assume that the concepts of control and perform-
ance are interchangeable in all situations. Indeed,
there is a view, expressed recently through, for
instance, the debates on Sarbanes Oxley, that
control is inimical to performance. Throughout the
paper we were careful to use phrases that suggest
that performance measures are used in diagnostic
and interactive control systems, following Simons
(1995, 2000, 2005), without seeking to make
stronger assertions regarding the underlying rela-
tionships. Equally, whilst we draw upon the
concepts of single-loop and double-loop feedback,
which are particular forms of control, we do not
wish to suggest that other forms of control are not
important. Additional theoretical elaboration and
clariﬁcation is necessary. A variety of papers
provide relevant reviews which provide a starting
point for such work. For instance, for reviews of the
management control systems literature see
Langﬁeld-Smith (1997) and Chenhall (2003). For
a review that addresses the enabling and constrain-
ing roles of performance measurement systems, see
Wouters and Wilderom (2008).
Notwithstanding these limitations, our ﬁndings
complement recent contributions which have
begun to reassess the value of non-ﬁnancial
performance measurement systems. The balanced
scorecard philosophy in particular has spurred
interest in the notion of combining leading and
lagging performance indicators to optimise ﬁrm
performance over the longer-term (Kaplan and
Norton, 1996, 2000). These claims assume that
non-ﬁnancial measures create effects that are
different to, and overcome the limitations associ-
ated with, the sole use of ﬁnancial measures.
However, recent literature has begun to question
this assumption. For example, Lau and Sholihin
(2005) found no differences between ﬁnancial and
non-ﬁnancial measures for the behavioural conse-
quences of performance measurement systems. In
a second example, Ittner, Larcker and Meyer
(2003) report a case study based upon a balanced
scorecard based reward system, which is claimed
by Kaplan and Norton (2001) to have positive
effects, and describe how the system was ultim-
ately abandoned. Our ﬁndings complement this
emerging body of research by highlighting the
need to consider the ways in which performance
measures are used in addition to the impact of the
measures per se.
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10We examined role ambiguity as a potential determinant of
short-termism. Our ﬁndings support those of Marginson and
McAulay (2008), who found increasing role ambiguity to be
associated with increasing short-termism. Results are not
reported in this paper but are available on request.
11We thank an anonymous reviewer for alerting us to the
issue raised in this paragraph.
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Appendix
Inter-temporal trade-off
The questionnaire contained a number of sections addressing a broad research agenda based upon the
management control systems and performance measurement systems literatures. One of the sections
asked managers to provide a variety of responses to speciﬁc issues including but not restricted to
short-termism. Questions were listed randomly and the questions below were interspersed with other
questions. The numbering given below assists referencing in the main body of the text of the article
and is not intended to give an indication of the structure of the questionnaire.
Rubric on the questionnaire
The following statements describe how people may feel about their work situation. Please indicate
the extent to which you agree or disagree with each item using the following scale: Scale: 1 (Strongly
agree) – 5 (Strongly disagree)
1. I prefer to sacriﬁce long-term beneﬁts in order to achieve short-term performance targets.
2. I believe that short-term results should be achieved, even if this means forgoing long-term pay-
offs.
3. I am willing to sacriﬁce long-term performance in order to achieve short-term results.
4. In trade off situations, I prefer to sacriﬁce short-term results for expected long-term pay-offs.
5. I prefer to deviate from ﬁnancial targets where this leads to innovations which are likely to be
beneﬁcial in the long term.
6. I concentrate my attention on issues which will impact my targets beyond the next 18 months.
Note: Items 4, 5 and 6 were reverse scored.
Financial targets and non-ﬁnancial performance measures
The questionnaire contained separate sections for responses to ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial measures
and included statements within each section that related to diagnostic and interactive use. The use of
the terms ‘diagnostic’ and ‘interactive’ were omitted from the questionnaire and the items below were
listed randomly. The use of the term ‘targets’ replaced the term ‘performance measures’ from the
original version of the questionnaire following discussions with the ﬁrm in question. The rubric
below provides the framework for each of the two sections. The numbering given below assists
referencing in the main body of the text of the article and is not intended to give an indication of the
structure of the questionnaire. Table 2 follows the ordering of the items within the questionnaire.
Rubric on the questionnaire
The statements below relate to ﬁnancial (non-ﬁnancial) targets. Using the scale shown below, please
rate the extent to which you currently use ﬁnancial (non-ﬁnancial) targets: Scale: 1 (not at all) – 5 (to a
great extent).
Diagnostic use
7. Track progress towards goals
8. Monitor results
9. Compare outcomes to expectations
10. Review key measures
Interactive use
11. Encourage discussions in meetings*
12. Encourage continual challenge and debate of underlying data, assumptions and action plans
13. Provide a common view of the organisation
14. Tie the organisation together
15. Enable your area to focus on common issues*
16. Develop a common vocabulary in your area*
17. Enable your area to focus on critical success factors*
*The wording of these statements was adapted to ﬁt the ﬁrm in question.
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